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The growth of the patent system in the last quarter 
of a century in this country has reached a stage in its 
progress where the variety and magnitude of the 
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interests involved require accuracy, precision, and 
care in the preparation of all the papers on which 
the patent is founded. . . .  The developed and 
improved condition of the patent law, and of the 
principles which govern the exclusive rights 
conferred by it, leave no excuse for ambiguous 
language or vague descriptions. . . .  It seems to us 
that nothing can be more just and fair, both to the 
patentee and to the public, than that the former 
should understand, and correctly describe, just what 
he has invented, and for what he claims a patent.1 
Imagine you are Elwood Haynes, the inventor of the first true 
American automobile in 1894.2  Being the first American to invent 
an automobile designed to run entirely on its own power, you 
quickly make plans to build a factory in Kokomo, Indiana to ramp 
up production.  You would be shocked, therefore, to learn that 
George Selden, a patent attorney from Rochester, NY, had already 
obtained a patent filed in 1879 not just for an internal combustion 
engine, but for its use on four-wheeled vehicles as well.3  To make 
matters worse, George Selden was going around to every 
American car manufacturer and demanding that they pay a royalty 
to his patent or else meet him in the court room.4  Although a 
group of car manufacturers, including Henry Ford, eventually 
stood up to Selden in court and won a judgment of non-
infringement of Selden’s patent,5 it is still amazing to consider the 
deterrent effect of Selden’s conduct on automobile innovation.6  
 
1 Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568, 573–74 (1876). 
2 See W.C. MADDEN, HAYNES-APPERSON AND AMERICA’S FIRST PRACTICAL 
AUTOMOBILE: A HISTORY 3 (McFarland & Co. Inc., 2003). 
3 See U.S. Patent No. 549,160 (filed May 8, 1879) (issued Nov. 5, 1895). 
4 See Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent 
Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 889 (1990). 
5 See Columbia Motor Car Co. v. C.A. Durer & Co., 184 F. 893, 915 (2d Cir. 1911). 
6 See Merges & Nelson supra note 4, at 890 (“Law suits based on [Selden’s patent] 
surely did absorb considerable time and attention of people like Henry Ford, whose 
production methods revolutionized the industry.  Perhaps more importantly smaller firms 
may have been put off by the threat of suit.  At this early stage in the history of the 
technology, those that left the industry or chose not to enter may well have taken valuable 
improvements with them.”); see also Columbia Motor Car Co., 184 F. at 895 (“While he 
withheld his patent, the public learned from independent inventors all that it could teach.  
For the monopoly granted by his patent he had nothing to offer in return.”). 
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Indeed, Selden could be described as an overreaching inventor, 
who thought up an improvement to a one-cylinder engine and later 
obtained a patent to all uses of an internal combustion engine for 
use in an automobile.  In the words of the court: “[t]he public 
gained absolutely nothing from his invention, whatever it was.  
From the point of view of public interest it were [sic] even better 
that the patent had never been granted.”7 
To those unfamiliar with patent law, it may come as a surprise 
that an inventor can file for a patent without actually making the 
thing he alleges to have invented.  However, to the United States 
Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”), filing a patent 
application is as good as actually constructing the invention in real 
life.8  That being so, what ensures that a patentee does not obtain a 
patent to something he has not really invented?  The answer is 
primarily two doctrines, both contained within 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 
1.9  The first is the “written description” requirement and the 
second is the “enablement” requirement.  These doctrines work 
together to ensure that when the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office grants a patent to an inventor, the public gets 
something in return.10 
On August 21, 2009, the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit granted Ariad Pharmaceuticals’ petition for rehearing en 
banc and requested briefs addressing: 1) “[w]hether 35 U.S.C. § 
112, [¶] 1, contains a written description requirement separate from 
an enablement requirement;”11 and 2) if so, “what is the scope and 
 
7 Columbia Motor Car Co., 184 F. at 895. 
8 See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF 
PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2138.05 (8th ed. 2008). 
9 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006). 
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, 
and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, 
clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the 
art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to 
make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode 
contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention. 
Id. 
10 See Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916, 922 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 
2004). 
11 Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 595 F.3d 1329, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 
(granting the petition for rehearing en banc). 
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purpose of the requirement?”12  In considering these issues, the 
Federal Circuit reexamined a doctrine that traced its origins back to 
at least the Patent Act of 1793.13  In the decade leading up to Ariad 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co.,14 a number of judges on 
the Federal Circuit had begun to question the existence and scope 
of the written description requirement in their dissents.15  By 
accepting the en banc petition, the court decided that now was the 
proper time to resolve these questions.  On March 22, 2010, the 
court finally answered the questions: “[w]e now reaffirm that § 
112, first paragraph, contains a written description requirement 
separate from enablement” and “[t]hat the adequacy of the 
[written] description of the manner and process of making and 
using the invention is judged by whether that description enables 
one skilled in the art to make and use the same . . . .”16 
Writing for the majority in Ariad, Judge Lourie explained that 
the written description requirement ensures that the public gets its 
fair share of the bargain when an inventor is granted a patent and 
serves a related yet distinct purpose from the undisputed 
enablement requirement:17 it ensures that the inventor actually 
invented the subject matter claimed by his or her patent.18  This 
Article argues that in so holding the Ariad court properly resolved 
this dispute.  Part I of this Article will first discuss the simplified 
 
12 Id. 
13 See Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en 
banc). 
14 598 F.3d 1336, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
15 See, e.g., id. at 1361–62 (Rader, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (citing 
Lizardtech, Inc. v. Earth Res. Mapping, Inc., 433 F.3d 1373, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2006) 
(Rader, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc)); Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. 
Searle & Co., 375 F.3d 1303, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Rader, J., dissenting from denial of 
rehearing en banc); id. at 1325 (Linn, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); 
Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 976 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Rader, J., 
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); id. at 987 (Linn, J., dissenting from denial 
of rehearing en banc). 
16 Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1340, 1344. 
17 See id. at 1345 (“[A] separate requirement to describe one's invention is basic to 
patent law.  Every patent must describe an invention.  It is part of the quid pro quo of a 
patent; one describes an invention, and, if the law’s other requirements are met, one 
obtains a patent.  The specification must then, of course, describe how to make and use 
the invention (i.e., enable it), but that is a different task.”). 
18 See id. at 1351 (“[T]he specification must describe an invention understandable to 
that skilled artisan and show that the inventor actually invented the invention claimed.”). 
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facts of Ariad.  Part I will then discuss the role of the enablement 
and the written description requirements in the United States 
Patent System and trace the historical development of the written 
description requirement from the early Supreme Court decisions up 
through the modern day Federal Circuit decisions.  Part II will 
discuss the three main viewpoints of the Federal Circuit on written 
description as represented by Chief Judge Rader,19 Judge Lourie, 
and Judge Linn.  Part III of this Article will first analyze the 
historical purpose of the written description requirement and then 
analyze some common misconceptions and mischaracterizations of 
the written description requirement.  Part III will then discuss some 
common ground among the judges of the Federal Circuit.  This 
Article concludes with suggestions for the role the written 
description requirement should play going forward. 
I. DISCUSSION 
A. Simplified Factual Background of Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 
v. Eli Lilly and Co. 
The technology at issue in Ariad  involves the discovery of a 
molecule named NF-KB.20  This molecule is akin to an “all-
purpose cellular paramedic.”21  When a cell in the body detects a 
harmful presence, such as bacteria, NF-KB is “activated.”22  The 
activated NF-KB travels to the nucleus of the cell, where it 
attaches to its binding site in the DNA, and activates the 
production of, among other things, certain cytokines.23  These 
cytokines help the cell survive that harmful presence, but the 
cytokines themselves can be toxic in excess.24  Once the original 
 
19  Judge Rader assumed the duties of Chief Judge on June 1, 2010. Randall R. Rader, 
Chief Judge, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FED. CIR., http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/ 
index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=132&Itemid=24 (last visited Dec. 17, 
2010).  For the sake of consistency this Article will refer to him as Chief Judge Rader 
throughout. 
20 Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 F.3d 1366, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2009), aff’d en 
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harmful presence is eliminated, such as when the bacterial 
infection is cured, NF-KB activity decreases and the cell returns to 
its original state.25 
The owners of U.S. Patent No. 6,410,516 (“the ’516 patent”) 
identified NF-KB and its pathway for entering the nucleus and 
activating the production of cytokines.26  As stated above, 
excessive NF-KB activation can, in itself, result in heightened 
toxicity to the cell if left unchecked.  For this reason, the inventors 
of the ’516 patent hypothesized that if NF-KB activation could be 
reduced, it might be possible to reduce these toxic side effects.27  
Based on this hypothesis, Ariad claimed three methods of reducing 
NF-KB activation in the ’516 patent.28  In general, Ariad proposed 
three hypothetical methods of reducing NF-KB activation by: 1) 
holding NF-KB in an inactive state by introducing its natural 
inhibitor; 2) having another molecule bind to the DNA in the place 
where NF-KB would otherwise bind (a so-called “dominantly 
interfering molecule”); and 3) using a decoy molecule to bind to 
NF-KB itself.29  Upon analysis of the specification, however, the 
patent application disclosed no working examples, let alone any 
prophetic examples, of methods of actually reducing NF-KB 
activity.30 
In sum, Ariad’s invention was the identification of NF-KB and 
its role in gene activation.  Ariad hypothesized that if NF-KB 
activation is reduced, some toxic symptoms associated with known 
diseases could likewise be reduced.  Ariad, however, did not 
actually invent a way of reducing NF-KB activation.  Rather, Ariad 
hypothesized some probable ways to reduce NF-KB activation and 
attempted to obtain a broad patent claiming any possible method of 
suppressing NF-KB activation.  The Federal Circuit found this was 
“little more than a research plan” and “an attempt to preempt the 
future before it has arrived.”31  Because the inventors did not 
describe any method of reducing NF-KB activation, their patent 
 
25 Id. at 1369–70. 
26 Id. at 1369. 
27 Id. at 1370. 
28 Id. at 1372. 
29 Id. at 1374–75. 
30 Id. at 1376. 
31 Id. at 1373, 1376 (quoting Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). 
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was held invalid for failing to satisfy the written description 
requirement under § 112.32  The Federal Circuit did not reach the 
question of whether the patent fulfilled the enablement requirement 
because it held that, even if one skilled in the art was enabled to 
make the invention, “the scope of the right to exclude . . . does not 
overreach the scope of the inventor's contribution to the field of art 
as described in the patent specification.”33  The court relied on the 
written description doctrine to ensure that the scope of the patent 
was commensurate with Ariad’s discovery and cautioned Ariad to 
be careful in what it asked for from the USPTO.34 
B. Brief Overview of the United States Patent System 
Before tracing the case development of the written description 
requirement, this Section will briefly discuss some fundamental 
aspects of the United States patent system.  The ultimate goal of 
the patent system is to bring new designs and technologies into the 
public domain through disclosure.35  The exclusive rights granted 
by a patent are the carrots enticing inventors to make their 
invention known to the public.  Before an inventor can obtain a 
patent, the USPTO must first examine the patent application to 
determine whether it satisfies the statutory requirements by 
“drawing a line between the things which are worth to the public 
the embarrassment of an exclusive patent, and those which are 
not.”36  The core requirements of patent eligibility are that the 
invention must be useful, novel, and non-obvious.37 
Once the Patent Office has determined that the invention is 
useful, novel, and non-obvious, an inventor must still satisfy 
additional requirements.  Several of these additional requirements 
 
32 Id. at 1376–77. 
33 Id. at 1371 (quoting Reiffin v. Microsoft Corp., 214 F.3d 1342, 1345–46 (Fed. Cir. 
2000)). 
34 See id. at 1377 (“The motto, beware of what one asks for, might be applicable here.” 
(quoting Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 481 F.3d 1371, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2007)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
35 See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989) 
(quoting United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186–87 (1933)). 
36 Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 148 (quoting 13 THOMAS JEFFERSON, WRITINGS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 335 (Memorial ed. 1904)). 
37 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–03 (2006). 
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are located within 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1.38  These relate to how 
detailed the inventor must be in his description of his own 
invention.  The patent applicant must  
describe his invention so that others may construct 
and use it after the expiration of the patent and [] 
inform the public during the life of the patent of the 
limits of the monopoly asserted, so that it may be 
known which features may be safely used or 
manufactured without a license and which may 
not.39   
Section 112, ¶ 1 has been construed to contain three 
requirements.40  At issue for purposes of this Article are two of the 
three requirements, the enablement requirement and the written 
description requirement.41 
The enablement requirement and the written description 
requirement, although commingled, are separate and distinct.42  
The enablement requirement is satisfied when “the specification 
disclosure as a whole is such as to enable one skilled in the art to 
make and use the claimed invention . . . .”43  This requirement 
forces the inventor to explain to the public how to make and use 
his invention.  On the other hand, the function of the written 
description requirement “is broader than to merely explain how to 
‘make and use’ [the invention]; the applicant must also convey 
with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art, as of the filing 
date sought, that he or she was in possession of the invention.”44  
This requirement forces the inventor to describe his invention in 
sufficient detail that the public understands his invention and 
 
38 Id. § 112. 
39 Schriber-Schroth Co. v. Cleveland Trust Co., 305 U.S. 47, 57 (1938) (quoting 
Permutit Co. v. Graver Corp., 284 U.S. 52, 60 (1931)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
40 35 U.S.C. § 112 (outlining a “written description” requirement, an enablement 
requirement, and a “best mode” requirement). 
41 See, e.g., In re Barker, 559 F.2d 588, 591 (C.C.P.A. 1977). 
42 See id. at 594 (Rich, J., concurring) (stating that the written description and 
enablement requirements are “distinct though commingled”). 
43 In re Moore, 439 F.2d 1232, 1235 (C.C.P.A. 1971). 
44 Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563–64 (Fed. Cir. 1991); see also In re 
Wertheim, 541 F.2d 257, 262 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The function of the description 
requirement is to ensure that the inventor had possession, as of the filing date of the 
application relied on, of the specific subject matter later claimed by him . . . .”). 
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recognizes the inventor’s contribution, and ensures that the 
inventor was truly in possession of the invention at the time he 
filed his patent application.   
In summary, written description and enablement are part of the 
§ 112 disclosure requirements.45  These disclosure requirements 
ensure that the public gets a reciprocal benefit in exchange for 
granting the inventor the exclusive patent rights.46 
In exchange for all the detailed information about the 
invention, the patent office and the inventor work together to draft 
claims covering the scope of the new invention.  Each sentence-
long claim gives the inventor the exclusive right to stop others 
from making, using, or selling his invention within the United 
States.47  It is these claims which define the outer bounds of the 
inventor’s exclusive patent rights.48 
C. Historical Development of the Written Description 
Requirement 
This Section will now trace the development of the written 
description requirement from the early Supreme Court cases, 
through the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals cases, through 
the early years at the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 
1. Early Supreme Court: Reconciling Written Description 
with Claims 
The first case applying a written description requirement is 
Evans v. Eaton.49  In Evans, the Supreme Court found a “written 
description” requirement in the Patent Act of 179350 and 
invalidated the inventor’s patent for failure to satisfy this 
requirement, even though his invention was sufficiently enabled.51  
Thus, while the inventor explained how to make and use his 
invention, his written description of that invention was deemed 
 
45 35 U.S.C. § 112. 
46 See Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568, 573–74 (1876). 
47 See 35 U.S.C. § 271. 
48 See Johnson & Johnston Assocs. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 
2002). 
49 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356 (1822). 
50 Id. at 433; see also Patent Act of 1793, Ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318 (1793). 
51 Evans, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) at 434–35. 
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deficient.  The purpose of the written description requirement, the 
Court explained, was to protect the public from the fear that an 
inventor may “pretend[] that his invention is more than what it 
really is.”52 
At the time of Evans, United States patent law did not require 
patents to have claims.  Patent claims were first required with the 
Patent Act of 1836 and their use continues to this day.53  A patent 
claim is a one-sentence description of an embodiment of the 
invention.  While other parts of a patent application describe how 
to make and use the invention, the patent claims define the precise 
boundaries between what the inventor regards to be his invention 
and what he does not.  Patent claims serve the public notice 
function of patent law by delineating the scope of the invention 
contained within the patent and defining the dividing line between 
infringing conduct and non-infringing conduct.  When a patent 
applicant prosecutes a patent at the USPTO, the primary focus of 
the back-and-forth between the inventor and the USPTO regards 
the precise drafting of patent claims.  A patent applicant files 
original claims and the USPTO, after searching the prior art, will 
often reject those claims as being too broad and capturing subject 
matter the patent applicant did not invent.  At this point, the patent 
applicant can either submit new claims or amend the original 
claims to hew more closely to the line between his contribution 
and what had been done before.  The written description 
requirement, separate and distinct from the enablement 
requirement, survived the invention of claims, as evidenced in 
O’Reilly v. Morse.54 
In O’Reilly, after Samuel Morse invented the telegraph, he 
attempted to claim the exclusive right not only to his own 
invention, but to all devices using electricity to print characters at a 
distance.55  This was, in fact, the scope of claim 8 of his patent.56  
The Court held Morse’s claim 8 was “too broad, and not warranted 
 
52 Id. at 434. 
53 See Patent Act of 1836, 5 Stat. 117. 
54 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 113 (1854). 
55 Id. at 112–13. 
56 Id. at 111–12.  Interestingly, this claim in his patent even survived a reissue at the 
USPTO.  Id. 
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by law” because it was beyond the scope of his description.57  
Morse had claimed “an exclusive right to use a manner and process 
which he has not described and indeed had not invented, and 
therefore could not describe when he obtained his patent.”58  Just 
as the inventor of the first steam engine was not entitled to a patent 
giving him the exclusive right to use steam as a motive power for 
the purpose of propelling vessels, the Court reasoned, Morse was 
not allowed to “shut[] the door against inventions of other persons” 
in this area where it was not within his invention description.59  
While the scope of Morse’s patent may have raised patentable 
subject matter concerns, it was nonetheless rejected for exceeding 
the scope of the invention described by Morse at the time of 
filing.60 
Following Morse, the Court continued to employ the written 
description requirement as a basis to invalidate patents and patent 
claims where the inventor had overreached beyond his true 
invention.61 
During the period from the late 1800s through the early 1900s, 
it appears as though the Court was attempting to define the role of 
the written description requirement in light of the relatively recent 
addition of claims.  Until this time, inventors were, perhaps 
intentionally, accustomed to using ambiguous terms to specify 
their inventions, and claims were added as an additional 
requirement to circumscribe the invention at its broadest.62  In both 
McClain v. Ortmayer63 and White v. Dunbar,64 for example, an 
alleged infringer’s invention did not fall within the scope of the 
patentee’s claims, yet the patentee sued, essentially arguing, “but 
this falls within what I said in my specification.”  In response, the 
 
57 Id. at 113. 
58 Id. (emphasis added). 
59 Id. at 113. 
60 Id. at 119–20. 
61 See Schriber-Schroth Co. v. Cleveland Trust Co., 305 U.S. 47, 56–57 (1938); 
Permutit Co. v. Graver Corp., 284 U.S. 52, 55 (1931) (invalidating patent for an 
apparatus for softening water for lack of written description); Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 
U.S. 568, 572 (1876) (invalidating claim to deodorized heavy oils for lack of written 
description). 
62 Merrill, 94 U.S. at 573. 
63 141 U.S. 419 (1891). 
64 119 U.S. 47 (1886). 
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Court consistently reiterated the theme that “[t]he claim is the 
measure of [the patentee’s] right to relief, and while the 
specification may be referred to[,] to limit the claim, it can never 
be made available to expand it.”65  Thus, at a time when the United 
States was among the first (if not the first) to require patent claims, 
the Court emphasized that these claims had a purpose—that of 
delimiting the “metes and bounds” of the invention so as to put the 
public on notice of the maximum scope of the patent66—and made 
clear that the written description in the specification could not be 
relied upon to expand the patent scope beyond the claims.   
2. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals: Adding Structure to 
§ 112 
The Court of Customs, initially formed in 1910, changed its 
name to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (“CCPA”) in 
1929 and took on appeals from the United States Patent Office.67  
Regarding patent appeals, these took the form of either ex parte 
patent cases or inter partes interferences.68  Prior to the creation of 
the CCPA, these appeals were handled by the Court of Appeals for 
the D.C. Circuit.69  The Patent Act of 1952 enacted the current 
version of 35 U.S.C. § 112 containing the “written description” 
requirement, among others, within its first paragraph.70 
In the cases following the enactment of the Patent Act of 1952, 
the CCPA expressed frustration with the USPTO in many 
 
65 McClain, 141 U.S. at 424. 
66 See id.  
67 Federal Judicial History: U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (Successor to 
the Court of Customs Appeals), 1910–1982, FED. JUD. CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/history/ 
home.nsf/page/courts_special_cpa.html [hereinafter Federal Judicial History] (last 
visited Oct. 21, 2010). 
68 Ex parte actions are those cases between the patent applicant and the U.S. Patent & 
Trademark Office concerning whether the applicant is entitled to a patent.  Inter partes 
actions, on the other hand, are those cases between two patent applicants and the dispute 
is over which applicant is entitled to the patent—essentially, which applicant invented the 
invention first.  See Federal Judicial History, supra note 67; see also Board of Patent 
Appeals and Interferences, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/ 
ip/boards/bpai/index.jsp (last visited Oct. 16, 2010). 
69 See Federal Judicial History, supra note 67. 
70 See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006). 
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opinions.71  This frustration stemmed from the USPTO’s rejecting 
patents under § 112 without specifying the particular deficiency 
under § 112 and sometimes even mischaracterizing rejections 
under § 112.72 
The USPTO’s confusion should come as little surprise when § 
112 contains six paragraphs, and Judge Rich himself noted that 
several requirements exist within the first paragraph alone.73  Judge 
Baldwin finally, in In re Moore,74 took it upon himself to reduce 
confusion at the USPTO and “for the sake of completeness[,]” laid 
out the requirements under the first and second paragraphs of § 
112.75  Notably, Judge Baldwin expressed three requirements in 
the first paragraph of § 112: 1) the description of the invention, 2) 
enablement, and 3) best mode.76 
From this point on, the written description requirement 
continued to undergo case-by-case application and development.77  
The majority of the cases involving § 112 written description at the 
CCPA fell primarily into three categories: 1) interference 
proceedings, where two inventors essentially try to prove who was 
 
71 See In re Moore, 439 F.2d 1232, 1235 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (expressing frustration with 
USPTO’s imprecise rejection under § 112); In re Robins, 429 F.2d 452, 456 n.5 
(C.C.P.A. 1970) (finding “the examiner's Answer to be singularly unclear as to the 
particular requirement or requirements of § 112 which were thought not to have been 
met”); In re Borkowski, 422 F.2d 904, 909 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (finding examiner took 
improper approach to § 112, second paragraph rejection because the claims were more 
properly rejected under § 112, first paragraph); In re Ruschig, 379 F.2d 990, 995–96 
(C.C.P.A. 1967) (discussing examiner’s unclear basis for rejecting claims based on § 
112); In re Gay, 309 F.2d 769, 772 (C.C.P.A. 1962) (finding USPTO “confuse[d]” when 
best mode rejection was really an enablement rejection). 
72 See Moore, 439 F.2d at 1232; Robins, 429 F.2d at 456 n.5; Borkowski, 422 F.2d at 
909; Ruschig, 379 F.2d at 995–96; Gay, 309 F.2d at 772. 
73 Gay, 309 F.2d at 772 (noting that “two of the several requirements” exist in ¶ 1 
alone). 
74 439 F.2d at 1232. 
75 Id. at 1235. 
76 Id. at 1235–36. 
77 See In re Rasmussen, 650 F.2d 1212, 1214 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (finding § 112 is 
properly used to reject a claim amended to recite elements that lack support in the 
original disclosure); see also In re Koller, 613 F.2d 819, 825 (C.C.P.A. 1980) (reversing 
USPTO’s rejection under § 102 on the grounds that applicant satisfied written description 
requirement of § 112); In re Barker, 559 F.2d 588, 593 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (purportedly 
resolving issue of whether “enablement” under § 112 is different from “written 
description” under § 112). 
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the first inventor;78 2) rejections during prosecution based upon 
anticipation where the applicant attempts to rely on an earlier filing 
to “swear behind” a cited reference;79 and, 3) rejections during 
prosecution when later amendments were rejected for being unduly 
broad.80 
One of the more interesting cases during this time period is In 
re Barker.81  At issue in Barker was whether the “enablement” 
requirement is separate from the “written description” 
requirement.82  While this case purports to resolve the issue, the 
dividing lines quickly became apparent in this case, which 
generated a total of three opinions.  This is perhaps the first case on 
record where the splintering of the court can be seen regarding the 
issue of written description.  Judge Miller, writing for the court, 
traced the development of the written description doctrine through 
the patent acts starting with the Patent Act of 1790 up through the 
Patent Act of 1952.83  Judge Miller ultimately concluded that the 
written description and enablement requirements are separate 
because “[t]hat a person skilled in the art might realize from 
reading the disclosure that such a step is possible is not a sufficient 
indication to that person that that step is part of [a patentee’s] 
invention.”84  Judge Rich, agreeing with the result, would have 
resolved this case on application of § 132 and did not “subscribe to 
[the majority’s] interpretation through assumptions based on 
presumptions about the usage of superfluous words and the like.”85  
Judge Rich, of course, had previously found a separate written 
description requirement in In re Ruschig.86  Chief Judge Markey 
dissented, arguing that the written description requirement “was 
 
78 See, e.g., Fields v. Connover, 443 F.2d 1386 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (considering which 
party had priority over a patent relating to a chemical compound). 
79 See, e.g., Koller, 613 F.2d at 821.  An applicant “swears behind” a reference by 
providing proof, along with a sworn affidavit, that the applicant conceived his invention 
at a date prior to the date of the cited reference. 
80 See, e.g., Rasmussen, 650 F.2d at 1215. 
81 559 F.2d 588 (C.C.P.A. 1977). 
82 See id. at 591. 
83 Id. at 592–93. 
84 Id. at 593 (quoting In re Winkhaus, 527 F.2d 637, 640 (C.C.P.A. 1975)). 
85 Id. at 594 (Rich, J., concurring) (noting that the new matter should be rejected solely 
on the basis of its violation of § 132). 
86 379 F.2d 990, 995–96 (C.C.P.A. 1967). 
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solely a judicial (and unnecessary) response to chemical cases in 
which appellants were arguing that those skilled in the art ‘might’ 
make and use a claimed invention.”87 
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals went a long way to 
help clarify the law used daily by the USPTO in examining patent 
applications.  The court at various times recognized a written 
description requirement separate and apart from the enablement 
requirement.88  However, while a majority of the court seemed to 
consider the issue resolved, the debate over the role of the written 
description requirement between Judge Miller, Judge Rich, and 
Chief Judge Markey in In re Barker foreshadowed the debate in 
Ariad more than thirty years later.89 
3. Early Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: How to 
Apply Precedent From USPTO Appeals at CCPA to 
Infringement Appeals from District Courts 
In 1982, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was 
formed as a merger of the Court of Claims and the CCPA.90  The 
Federal Circuit, in its first published opinion, adopted as binding 
precedent all the prior decisions of both the Court of Claims and 
the CCPA.91  The jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit was also 
expanded to include, among other things, appeals in patent cases 
from the district courts.  Thus, for the first time, there would be a 
dedicated appellate court for hearing disputes between patentees 
and alleged infringers.  Some scholars feared that the Federal 
Circuit would not benefit from the “percolation” that normally 
occurs in the regional circuits.92  The law in general and the 
 
87 Barker, 559 F.2d at 594 (Markey, J., dissenting). 
88 See, e.g., id. at 593 (Rich, J., concurring); In re Smith, 481 F.2d 910, 914 (C.C.P.A. 
1973). 
89 Compare Barker, 559 F.2d at 593 with Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 
F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir 2010) (en banc). 
90 Federal Courts Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982); see also 
Federal Circuit Act of 1982, FED. JUD. CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/ 
page/landmark_22.html (last visited Aug. 27, 2010). 
91 South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1982). 
92  See, e.g., Ellen R. Jordan, Specialized Courts: A Choice?, 76 NW. U. L. REV. 745, 
784 (1981) (noting that the efficiencies of a specialized patent court could “come at some 
cost, for better results may come from the ‘confluence of doctrines’” associated with 
courts of general jurisdiction hearing patent cases). 
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Supreme Court specifically, benefit from analyzing the varying 
approaches and rules of law among the regional circuits to decide 
which should prevail.  Prior to the creation of the Federal Circuit, 
the predecessor court would only have had occasion to apply the 
written description requirement as a challenge to the validity of 
originally filed claims if the issue had already been raised by the 
USPTO in a rejection.93  Now, alleged infringers could raise the 
issue of the failure to comply with the written description 
requirement of § 112 as an affirmative defense to patent 
infringement.94 
The written description doctrine at the Federal Circuit got off 
to a rocky start.  In Kennecott Corp. v. Kyocera Int’l Inc.,95 the 
court stated “[t]he purpose of the [written] description requirement 
. . . is to state what is needed to fulfil [sic] the enablement 
requirement.”96  Notably, this is a position similar to the one Chief 
Judge Rader, and others, take today.97  When read closely and in 
context, however, the case did not hold that a separate written 
description does not exist, but rather that “incorporation of the 
requirements of section 112 into section 120 ensures that the 
inventor had possession of [i.e., described] the later-claimed 
invention on the filing date of the earlier application.”98  The court 
in Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar,99 confirmed this aspect of the 
 
93 See, e.g., In re Steinhauer, 410 F.2d 411, 412 (C.C.P.A. 1969).  This is because 
appeals from infringement suits at that time would have gone to the regional circuits.  
Similar to the Federal Circuit’s present trademark jurisdiction, the CCPA could only hear 
patent disputes between the patent applicant and the USPTO or priority disputes between 
two patent applications.  In the latter situation, issues involving “original claims” are 
rarely at issue because in an interference proceeding, by definition, at least one applicant 
has amended their claim to be identical to those of the other, and thus trigger the 
interference. 
94 See, e.g., Kennecott Corp. v. Kyocera Int’l Inc., 835 F.2d 1419, 1421 (Fed. Cir. 
1987). 
95 835 F.2d 1419 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 
96 Id. at 1421. 
97 See, e.g., Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., Inc., 375 F.3d 1303, 1310 (Fed. 
Cir. 2004) (Rader, J., dissenting); id. at 1305 (Linn, J., dissenting). 
98 Kennecott, 835 F.2d at 1421.  35 U.S.C. § 120 defines the requirements for when a 
later-filed patent application may claim priority over an earlier-filed application. See 35 
U.S.C. § 120 (2006). 
99 935 F.2d 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
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decision in Kennecott and sought to clear up any potential 
confusion.100 
In Vas-Cath, the USPTO rejected Mahurkar’s attempt to claim 
priority back to the filing date of his previously filed design 
patent.101  Mahurkar filed a design patent depicting his invention in 
March of 1982.102  Subsequently, Mahurkar filed a utility patent in 
1984 containing the same diagram of his invention that he included 
with his design patent in 1982.103  Vas-Cath alleged that 
Mahurkar’s patent, filed in 1984, was invalid because a Canadian 
patent issued in August of 1982, anticipated Mahurkar’s patent.104  
Mahurkar claimed he was the first inventor and as proof, pointed to 
the filing of his design patent on March 1982, five months prior to 
the Canadian patent.105  The district court held that the drawings in 
the previously filed design patent did not satisfy the written 
description requirement of § 112, which was required for 
Mahurkar to claim priority of invention under § 120.106  The 
Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s holding finding that 
drawings alone may satisfy the written description requirement of 
§ 112.107  Mahurkar was entitled to claim he possessed the 
invention at least as early as March 1982—before the Canadian 
patent issued—because his pictures adequately described his 
invention.108 
Most interesting about the Vas-Cath opinion was Judge Rich’s 
review of the case law development of the written description 
requirement.109  Particularly, Judge Rich noted “some confusion” 
 
100 Id. at 1563–64. 
101 Id. at 1557.  Because patentability often turns on who did something first, i.e., who 
has “priority” of invention, applicants often try to prove they were first.  A patent 
applicant can claim priority back to an earlier-filed patent application, and hence be 
treated as though the newer application were filed on the earlier date, only if the 
requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 120 are satisfied.  See 35 U.S.C. § 120; see also supra note 
98. 
102 Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1557. 
103 Id. at 1558–59. 
104 See id. at 1558–59 (explaining that the Canadian patent asserted under § 102(b) was 
actually filed by Mahurkar shortly after he filed his U.S. design patent). 
105 Id. at 1559. 
106 Id. at 1557. 
107 Id. at 1565, 1567. 
108 See id. 
109 See id. at 1560–64. 
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as to whether the written description requirement is separate and 
distinct from the enablement requirement.110  To the extent 
Kennecott suggested written description and enablement are the 
same, Judge Rich simply disagreed and stated “we note that 
decisions of a three-judge panel of this court cannot overturn prior 
precedential decisions.”111  In conclusion, the court reaffirmed the 
existence of a “written description requirement” in § 112 that is 
separate and distinct from the enablement requirement.112 
4. Recent Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: 
Entrenchment and Percolation 
The development of the written description doctrine has been 
complicated within the last ten years at the Federal Circuit.  To be 
sure, not a single majority opinion ever held that the requirement 
simply did not exist.113  However, during this period, it became 
very clear how certain judges felt about the written description 
requirement.  For example, Union Oil Co. of California v. Atlantic 
Richfield Co. (“Unocal”),114 foreshadowed the current dispute 
between Judge Lourie and Chief Judge Rader over the written 
description requirement.  The patent at issue in Unocal was 
directed towards automobile gasoline compositions that reduce 
 
110 Id. at 1563. 
111 Id.  When the Federal Circuit was formed, it adopted as precedent all prior decisions 
by the CCPA. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.  The Federal Circuit is therefore 
bound both by its prior precedential decisions and prior CCPA decisions.  Further, the 
Federal Circuit can only overrule its own precedent (including binding CCPA decisions) 
by sitting en banc. Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1563. 
112 Id. 
113 See In re Wilder, 736 F.2d 1516, 1520 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“The description 
requirement is found in 35 U.S.C. § 112 and is separate from the enablement requirement 
of that provision.”); see also ICU Med., Inc. v. Alaris Med. Sys., Inc., 558 F.3d 1368, 
1377–78 (Fed. Cir. 2009); In re Alonso, 545 F.3d 1015, 1019, 1021–22 (Fed. Cir. 2008); 
Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 541 F.3d 1115, 1125–26 (Fed. Cir. 
2008); LizardTech, Inc. v. Earth Res. Mapping, Inc., 424 F.3d 1336, 1344–45 (Fed. Cir. 
2005); Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916, 921 (Fed. Cir. 2004); 
Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 968–69 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Gentry 
Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline Corp., 134 F.3d 1473, 1478–80 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Regents of the 
Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1566–69 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Fiers v. Revel, 
984 F.2d 1164, 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
114 208 F.3d 989 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (affirming the validity of a patent claiming 
automotive gasoline compositions that reduce tailpipe emissions as against petroleum 
refiners).  
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tailpipe emissions.115  At issue was whether the patent, which 
described the invention in terms of ranges but otherwise failed to 
describe the exact chemical component of each combination falling 
within the disclosed ranges, satisfied the written description 
requirement.116  In Unocal, Chief Judge Rader wrote for the court 
affirming the validity of the patent-in-suit, on the grounds that it 
satisfied the written description requirement under § 112.117  Judge 
Lourie, in dissent, expressed his frustration that the majority was 
conflating written description and enablement.118   
The debate over the written description requirement continued 
in Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc.119  In Enzo, the district 
court first invalidated Enzo’s patent for failing to satisfy the 
written description requirement of § 112.120  On appeal, the Federal 
Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding of invalidity.121  Enzo 
then requested a rehearing (panel and en banc) on the issue of 
invalidity, and this time the Federal Circuit determined its prior 
decision on written description was incorrect.122  The court 
therefore vacated its prior panel decision, vacated the district 
court’s grant of summary judgment finding the patent invalid for 
failure to satisfy the § 112 written description requirement, and 
denied the petition for en banc rehearing.123  Several opinions were 
written for this case, and the positions of particular judges began to 
solidify.124  The positions are discussed in detail in Part II below. 
After Enzo, the views of certain judges became more 
pronounced.  For example, Moba, B.V. v. Diamond Automation, 
Inc.,125 is signed “per curiam.”  However, it is eerily reminiscent of 
Chief Judge Rader’s view on written description, although it does 
 
115    Id. at 991. 
116    See id. at 997. 
117 Id. at 1001. 
118 See id. at 1002. 
119 323 F.3d 956 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
120 Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., No. 99-4548, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23791 
at *2–3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2001). 
121 Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 285 F.3d 1013, 1015 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
122 Enzo, 323 F.3d at 960. 
123 Id. 
124 See id. at 971 (Lourie, J., concurring); id. at 975 (Newman, J., concurring); id. (Dyk, 
J., concurring); id. at 976 (Rader, J., dissenting); id. at 987 (Linn, J., dissenting). 
125 325 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
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not go as far as his earlier pronouncements.126  Chief Judge Rader 
also wrote a concurring opinion in Moba further expressing his 
view on written description, a position consistent with his earlier 
opinion in Unocal and his later opinion in University of Rochester 
v. G.D. Searle & Co.127 
In Rochester,128 the viewpoints of particular judges became 
apparent once again.  Judge Lourie wrote the panel opinion 
holding the University of Rochester’s patent invalid for failure to 
comply with the written description requirement of § 112.129  
Judge Lourie’s view on the law of written description was 
consistent with his earlier position taken in Enzo and Unocal.130  
The Federal Circuit later denied Rochester’s petition for en banc 
rehearing, resulting in five separate judicial opinions.131 
The confusion surrounding the role of the written description 
requirement finally came to a head in the first Ariad decision.  In 
Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Co.,132  Judge Moore, 
writing for the majority, found Ariad’s patent invalid for failure to 
comply with the written description requirement.133  Judge Linn 
wrote a concurrence, finding the written description aspect of the 
decision supported by precedent, but expressing his view that a 
separate written description requirement is misguided.134  The 
court finally decided it was time to resolve the conflicts 
surrounding the written description requirement and granted 
 
126  See id. at 1309, 1319–20 (describing two applications of written description case 
law, one consistent with 1967 precedent as priority policing, and one new creation in 
1997 with the criticized Lilly opinion). 
127 Compare Moba, 325 F.3d at 1323, with Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 
375 F.3d at 1303, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2004), and Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 
208 F.3d 989, 997 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
128 358 F.3d 916 (Fed. Cir. 2004), en banc reh’g denied, 375 F.3d 1303. 
129 Id. at 917. 
130 Compare Rochester, 375 F.3d at 1305 with Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 
323 F.3d 956, 960 (Fed. Cir. 2002), and Unocal, 208 F.3d at 1002. 
131 See Rochester, 375 F.3d at 1304 (Newman, J., dissenting); id. at 1305 (Lourie, J., 
concurring); id. at 1307 (Rader, J., dissenting); id. at 1325 (Linn, J., dissenting); id. at 
1327 (Dyk, J., concurring). 
132 Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2009), aff’d en banc, 
598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
133 Id. at 1380. 
134 Id. at 1380–81 (Linn, J., concurring). 
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Ariad’s petition for en banc rehearing on the issue of written 
description.135 
Analyzing the case law development of the written description 
requirement during this period at the Federal Circuit is extremely 
difficult.  Many contradictory opinions (whether concurring or 
dissenting) were written regarding the scope and application of the 
written description requirement.  Binding precedent established a 
separate written description requirement and its scope, but many 
judges were beginning to question the wisdom of that precedent.  
By this time, the three main camps had settled upon their body of 
case law for string quotes and propositions that favored their 
positions, while dismissing others away as dicta or not entirely 
accurate.136  “The differences of opinion among the judges of the 
Federal Circuit, are, in microcosm, the ‘percolation’ that scholars 
feared would be lost by a national court at the circuit level.”137  
This splintering of the Federal Circuit into three main camps 
regarding the role of the written description requirement is 
therefore not bad at all.  On the contrary, this creative tension 
serves to benefit patent law and is precisely the reason the Federal 
Circuit has succeeded despite its unique structure in the federal 
court system.  However, in granting Ariad’s petition for rehearing 
en banc, the court seems to have decided that the question of a 
separate written description requirement “ha[d] percolated enough” 
and was “ripe for en banc resolution.”138 
II. THREE MAIN CAMPS IN THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 
In researching the written description debate at the Federal 
Circuit, three voices stand out time and again: Chief Judge 
Rader’s, Judge Lourie’s, and Judge Linn’s.  The Federal Circuit is 
highly respected for its well rounded and esteemed bench, and 
these three are certainly no exception.  Indeed, among this group of 
 
135 Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 595 F.3d 1329, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 
(granting the petition for rehearing en banc). 
136 See supra note 131 (highlighting differing opinions among Federal Circuit judges on 
the written description requirement). 
137 Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 375 F.3d 1303, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
(Newman, J., dissenting). 
138 Id. 
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three judges are the current Chief Judge of the Federal Circuit, 
three Jefferson Medal Recipients, and two former patent 
practitioners.139 
A. Judge Lourie: Written Description Has Protected The Quid 
Pro Quo Since 1793 
Judge Lourie’s position is perhaps the simplest to explain and 
is articulated in his majority opinions in Rochester and Enzo.140  
His opinions and rationale governed every majority panel of the 
Federal Circuit since 1992.141  Essentially, Judge Lourie’s view is 
that the written description requirement exists and always has 
existed in patent law.142  “The purpose of the ‘written description’ 
requirement is broader than to merely explain how to ‘make and 
use’ the invention; rather, the applicant must also convey with 
reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing 
date sought, he or she was in possession of the invention.”143  The 
written description requirement, according to Judge Lourie, “is 
satisfied by the patentee’s disclosure of such descriptive means as 
words, structures, figures, diagrams, formulas, etc., that fully set 
forth the claimed invention.”144 
This construction of the written description requirement does 
not conflict with the role of patent claims, according to Judge 
Lourie.145  While the claims certainly define the right of the 
patentee to exclude others from practicing the invention, it is the 
written description that teaches the invention.146  An inventor is 
entitled to claims as broad as the invention which he has actually 
discovered.  Thus, while the claims must be supported by the 
 
139 See Judges, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FED. CIR., http://www.cafc.uscourts. 
gov/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=132&Itemid=24 (follow “Richard 
Linn, Circuit Judge” hyperlink and “Alan D. Lourie, Circuit Judge” hyperlink) (last 
visited Aug. 27, 2010). 
140 Rochester, 375 F.3d at 1305 (Lourie, J., concurring); Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-
Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 971 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Lourie, J., concurring). 
141 See supra notes 113–24 and accompanying text. 
142 Rochester, 375 F.3d at 1305. 
143 Enzo, 323 F.3d at 969 (quoting Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563–64 
(Fed. Cir. 1991)). 
144 Id. 
145 Id. (quoting Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
146 See Rochester, 375 F.3d at 1306 (Lourie, J., concurring). 
C03_SCHROEDER_010411_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 1/4/2011  6:08 PM 
86 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 21:63 
written description, the written description contains a lot of extra 
material that is not in the claims, but rather, is necessary to teach 
the invention and to explain precisely what constitutes the 
invention.147 
Judge Lourie’s view, and indeed the court’s view, of the 
written description requirement is necessarily more demanding 
than the views of Chief Judge Rader or Judge Linn.  This is so 
because in addition to the “enablement” requirement, which Judges 
Rader and Linn agree exists, Judge Lourie finds that a patentee 
must also meet the demands of a separate “written description” 
requirement, also contained in § 112.148  In Judge Lourie’s view, 
written description requires that inventors not only explain how to 
make and use the invention (i.e., “enable” the invention), but also 
explain in sufficient detail to one of skill in the art what it is that 
the inventor claims to have invented (i.e., “describe” the invention) 
and demonstrate that he had “possession” of the invention at the 
time of filing.149 
B. Chief Judge Rader: Judge Lourie’s Written Description is 
Dead, New Written Description as Priority Policeman 
Chief Judge Rader, on the other hand, views written 
description quite differently.  His view is also best illustrated by 
his dissents in Rochester and Enzo.  According to Chief Judge 
Rader, the written description doctrine that Judge Lourie traces 
back to the Patent Act of 1793 was actually superseded by the 
introduction of patent claims in the Patent Act of 1836.150  The 
only “written description” requirement, according to Chief Judge 
Rader, is the new “judge-made doctrine” created in 1967 by Judge 
Rich in In re Ruschig.151 
This new written description requirement was created only to 





150 See Enzo, 323 F.3d at 977 (Rader, J., dissenting) (“In later enactments [of the Patent 
Act], this notice function was assigned to claims, leaving enablement as the only purpose 
of the ‘written description’ language.”). 
151 See id. at 977–78 (citing In re Ruschig, 379 F.2d 990 (C.C.P.A. 1967)). 
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that were not contained in his original application.152  For example, 
consider a patent applicant who files a patent in 2001 covering a 
process of making freeze-dried instant coffee where concentrated 
coffee extract is freeze-dried when it contains solids between 25% 
and 60%.153  The patent applicant would not be able to amend his 
application in 2002 to include the process of making freeze-dried 
coffee where the solid content in the concentrated coffee extract is 
“greater than 35%.”  Nor is the patent applicant entitled to later 
claim the range from 35% to 100% as his invention because he did 
not describe his invention as covering that range when he filed his 
patent application in 2001.154  Rather, when the inventor first 
discovered his invention in 2001, he described his invention as 
covering only the range from 25% to 60%.  The written description 
requirement therefore serves one function: “to ensure that the 
inventor had possession, as of the filing date of the application 
relied on, of the specific subject matter later claimed by him.”155 
According to Chief Judge Rader, the Federal Circuit first made 
the mistake of applying the written description requirement as a 
general disclosure doctrine in place of enablement in the 1997 case 
of Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly and Co.156  In 
Lilly, the patent specification at issue disclosed a general method 
of producing human insulin cDNA and contained a description of 
rat insulin cDNA, but did not provide a written description of 
human insulin cDNA.157  The court held that “[d]escribing a 
method of preparing a cDNA or even describing the protein that 
the cDNA encodes, as the example [in the specification] does, does 
not necessarily describe the cDNA itself.”158  Accordingly, the 
court concluded, “a description of rat insulin cDNA is not a 
description of the broad classes of vertebrate or mammalian insulin 
 
152 See id. at 978. 
153 This example is loosely based upon the facts of In re Wertheim, 541 F.2d 257 
(C.C.P.A. 1976). 
154 Id. 
155 Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 375 F.3d 1303, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
(Rader, J., dissenting) (citing Wertheim, 541 F.2d at 262). 
156 See Enzo, 323 F.3d at 988 (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 
119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).   
157 See Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1567. 
158 Id. 
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cDNA,” including human cDNA.159  Chief Judge Rader would 
have invalidated the patent for failure to satisfy the enablement 
requirement instead, because “the inventor certainly did not show 
one of skill in the art how to make human insulin cDNA.”160  By 
invalidating the patent on the grounds of failure to satisfy the 
written description requirement, the Chief Judge argued, the 
Federal Circuit “purported to create a new doctrine for adequacy of 
disclosure that it labeled incorrectly ‘written description’ . . . 
[which] had never been a free-standing substitute for 
enablement.”161 
Chief Judge Rader’s position can be summed up by stating that 
written description is only properly used as a way to police priority 
of invention.  It ensures that an inventor does not file a patent 
application in Year 1, then later, in Year 3 try to claim his 
invention in Year 1 was broader than it really was.  In Chief Judge 
Rader’s view, the court’s “written description” requirement should 
not try to replace the existing enablement requirement, which has 
worked just fine. 
C. Judge Linn: There is No Written Description 
Judge Linn’s position on written description is expressed in 
Ariad, Rochester, and Enzo.  Judge Linn is of the opinion that there 
is no separate written description requirement.162  Section 112 
“requires no more of the specification than a disclosure that is 
sufficient to enable a person having ordinary skill in the art to 
make and use the invention.”163  The written description 
“requirement” is satisfied by the enablement requirement; 
therefore, a separate written description requirement does not 
exist.164  In Judge Linn’s view, the claims determine the scope of 
the invention and the creation of a separate written description 
 
159 Id. at 1568. 
160 Enzo, 323 F.3d at 980 (Rader, J., dissenting). 
161 Id. 
162 See Ariad Pharm., Inc., v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 F.3d 1366, 1380–81 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 
(Linn, J., concurring), aff’d en banc, 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
163 Id. 
164 See id. at 1381. 
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requirement confuses the public as to where they should look to 
determine the scope of the patent.165 
Judge Linn’s position is, in part, consistent with Chief Judge 
Rader’s opinion.166  While both believe that the need for a separate 
written description requirement was eliminated with the advent of 
patent claims, Judge Linn does not share Chief Judge Rader’s 
belief that a new “written description” requirement was created in 
1967.167  Thus, Judge Linn believes that once a patent is issued, the 
only inquiry into the specification should be for purposes of 
determining compliance with the enablement requirement.168 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Purpose of Written Description Requirement 
The purpose of the written description requirement stems from 
the social contract notion of patent law.  Before an inventor can 
secure the monopoly rights to exclude others from the practice of 
his invention, the inventor must make an adequate public 
disclosure of that invention.169  This concept is at the heart of our 
patent system.170 
The written description requirement serves to ensure that, in 
exchange for granting a patent, the public gets the full disclosure of 
the invention so that it may possess the entire invention when that 
patent expires.171  In Merrill v. Yeomans,172 the Court held a patent 
invalid for failure to comply with the written description 
requirement because the application was “far from possessing that 
 
165 See id. 
166 Compare Enzo, 323 F.3d at 977–78 (Rader, J., dissenting) (asserting that “the only 
purpose of the ‘written description’ language” in “later enactments” of the Patent Act is 
“enablement”), with Ariad, 560 F.3d at 1380–81 (Linn, J., concurring) (asserting that the 
purpose of a “written description of the invention” is enablement). 
167 See id. (noting that because claims are the true measure of the scope of a patent, a 
written description inquiry confuses the matter); see also Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. 
Searle & Co., 375 F.3d 1303, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
168 See Ariad, 560 F.3d at 1380–81. 
169 Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568, 570 (1876). 
170   The patent system was created to satisfy the constitutional instruction “[t]o promote 
the Progress of Science and useful Arts.” See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
171 See id. 
172  94 U.S. 568 (1876). 
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precision and clearness of statement with which one who proposes 
to secure a monopoly at the expense of the public ought to describe 
the thing which no one but himself can use or enjoy, without 
paying him for the privilege of doing so.”173  In further elaborating 
on this quid pro quo, the Court stated: 
The growth of the patent system in the last quarter 
of a century in this country has reached a stage in its 
progress where the variety and magnitude of the 
interests involved require accuracy, precision, and 
care in the preparation of all the papers on which 
the patent is founded. . . .  The developed and 
improved condition of the patent law, and of the 
principles which govern the exclusive rights 
conferred by it, leave no excuse for ambiguous 
language or vague descriptions.  The public should 
not be deprived of rights supposed to belong to it, 
without being clearly told what it is that limits these 
rights.  The genius of the inventor, constantly 
making improvements in existing patents,—a 
process which gives to the patent system its greatest 
value,—should not be restrained by vague and 
indefinite descriptions of claims in existing patents 
from the salutary and necessary right of improving 
on that which has already been invented.  It seems 
to us that nothing can be more just and fair, both to 
the patentee and to the public, than that the former 
should understand, and correctly describe, just what 
he has invented, and for what he claims a patent.174 
This public notice function of the written description 
requirement serves “to inform the public during the life of the 
patent of the limits of the monopoly asserted, so that it may be 
known which features may be safely used or manufactured without 
a license and which may not.”175  Thus, while the public can look 
to the claim of a patent, a one-sentence declaration of the scope of 
the invention, the inventor is only entitled to claims consistent in 
 
173 Id. 
174 Id. at 573–74. 
175 Permutit Co. v. Graver Corp., 284 U.S. 52, 60 (1931). 
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scope and magnitude with the actual invention.176  The CCPA, in 
In re Sus,177 recognized “[t]he public purpose on which the patent 
law rests requires the granting of claims commensurate in scope 
with the invention disclosed.”178  In other words, “the invention 
claimed shall be no broader than the invention set forth in the 
written description forming part of the specification.”179 
Judge Rich, in Fields v. Conover,180 commented on the policy 
grounds of written description.181  The patents at issue in Fields 
related to chemical compositions having antibacterial agents.182  
The dispute turned on whether Conover’s specification provided 
written description support for a specific compound when nowhere 
in the 196 pages of his specification was a single compound named 
or identified by formula.  Judge Rich’s discussion hints at the 
problem of a loose written description requirement, namely, that 
inventors will overreach, thus deterring legitimate future 
innovation: 
Here, Conover is concededly first with an extremely 
broad discovery, broad claims have already been 
allowed, and broad, non-elected claims roughly 
corresponding to Formula XXII are pending which, 
if allowed, will dominate most, if not all, the scope 
of Fields’ claims.  If Conover is allowed to copy 
Fields’ claims merely because the application is 
sufficient to teach how to make and use the subject 
matter thereof and points indistinctly and 
ambiguously in the general direction of that subject 
matter, the socially valuable incentive to further 
research and development provided by the 
opportunity to obtain subservient patents will be 
considerably diminished.183 
 
176 See In re Sus, 306 F.2d 494, 505 (C.C.P.A. 1962). 
177 306 F.2d 494, 505 (C.C.P.A. 1962). 
178 Id. at 497. 
179 Id. 
180  443 F.2d 1386 (C.C.P.A. 1971). 
181 Id. at 1392. 
182  Id. at 1387. 
183 Id.  
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This problem came full circle in Fiers v. Revel,184 a case 
involving original claims.  In Fiers, the Federal Circuit affirmed a 
denial of priority to an earlier-filed application because it did not 
provide adequate written description support under § 112.185  The 
court, in finding a lack of written description support, found 
Revel’s disclosure to represent merely “a wish, or arguably a plan, 
for obtaining the DNA.”186  The court explained that a “bare 
reference to a DNA with a statement that it can be obtained by 
reverse transcription is not a description; it does not indicate that 
Revel was in possession of the DNA.”187  Rather, “Revel’s 
application does not even demonstrate that the disclosed method 
actually leads to the DNA, and thus that he had possession of the 
invention, since it only discloses a clone that might be used to 
obtain mRNA coding for B-IF.”188 
The purpose of the written description requirement under § 112 
is, and always has been, to prevent inventors from overreaching 
when securing a patent from the public.  “[I]t is broader than to 
merely explain how to ‘make and use;’ the applicant must also 
convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of 
the filing date sought, he or she was in possession of the 
invention,” the invention being “whatever is now claimed.”189  
Further, “‘the invention’ is defined by the claims on appeal,” 
regardless of whether they are original claims or later-amended 
claims.190 
The written description requirement limits the inventor to that 
which he actually invented and disclosed in his original filing with 
the patent office—no more, no less.191  In order for the inventor to 
be “entitled” to a particular filing date, he must fully disclose his 
 
184 984 F.2d 1164, 1166, 1169 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
185 Id. 
186 Id. at 1171. 
187 Id. 
188 Id. 
189  Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563–64 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
190  See id. at 1565. 
191 O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 135 (1854) (Grier, J., dissenting); see also 
supra notes 98, 101 for a discussion of “swearing behind” and priority. 
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invention at the time of filing.192  Whether the inventor attempts to 
broaden his claims through amendment,193 to swear behind a § 112 
reference by claiming priority to an earlier-filed application,194 or 
to defend a broad charge in an interference,195 written description 
ensures that the inventor only gets rights to exclude commensurate 
in scope with that which he has actually invented.196  This is not to 
say the claims do not have a function; certainly they are the outer 
bounds of the scope of the patent.197  However, an inventor must 
first satisfy the written description requirement before he is entitled 
to claims of any breadth. 
Chief Judge Rader’s reading of the written description 
requirement—i.e., that it only functions to police priority to later-
filed claims—is too constricted.198  Whether an inventor is trying 
to swear behind a reference or obtain a patent with claims as 
originally filed, the policies of patent law require that he tell the 
public what he has invented.199  The written description 
requirement, as envisioned by Judge Lourie and consistent with 
nearly two hundred years of precedent serves to police priority 
even in original applications at the USPTO.  In order to establish 
entitlement to a particular filing date, the inventor must be able to 
describe, among other things, what it is that he has invented.  In 
other words, he must demonstrate that he is in “possession” of the 
 
192 Id. at 126–27 (Grier, J. dissenting) (holding a patent invalid for lack of written 
description when the inventor could not describe the process and did not actually invent 
it). 
193 See, e.g., In re Lew, 257 Fed. App’x 281, 285 (2007) (stating that an amendment is 
not inherent to the original specification for the purposes of § 112 if it would broaden the 
scope of the invention beyond the initial disclosure). 
194 See, e.g., Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1555. 
195 See, e.g., In re Baxter, 656 F.2d 679, 682 (C.C.P.A. 1981). 
196 See Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1353–54 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
(en banc). 
197 McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419, 424 (1891) (“The claim is the measure of [the 
patentee’s] right to relief, and while the specification may be referred to[,] to limit the 
claim, it can never be made available to expand it.”). 
198 See Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 981 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 
(Rader, J., dissenting). 
199 See McClain, 141 U.S. 419 at 423–24 (“Nothing is better settled in the law of 
patents than that the patentee may claim the whole or only a part of his invention, and 
that if he only describe and claim a part, he is presumed to have abandoned the residue to 
the public.” (emphasis added)). 
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claimed invention.  Written description is the “show me, don’t tell 
me” requirement of patent law. 
B. Common Misconceptions and Mischaracterizations of the 
Written Description Requirement 
1. Statutory Construction Supports Three Requirements in § 
112, ¶ 1. 
Chief Judge Rader suggests in Enzo that a separate written 
description requirement in 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1 disregards the clear 
mandate of the statute.200  Section 112, ¶ 1 provides: 
The specification shall contain a written description 
of the invention, and of the manner and process of 
making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and 
exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art 
to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly 
connected, to make and use the same, and shall set 
forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of 
carrying out his invention.201 
Upon inspection, it is apparent that there are two “, and”s in 
this section, effectively dividing this paragraph into three parts: 
[Construction 1:] 
The specification shall contain a written description 
[1] of the invention, and 
[2] of the manner and process of making and using 
it, 
in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms 
as to enable any person skilled in the art 
to which it pertains, or 
with which it is most nearly connected, 
to make and use the same, and 
[3] shall set forth the best mode contemplated by 
the inventor of carrying out his invention.202 
 
200 Enzo, 323 F.3d at 976 (Rader, J., dissenting). 
201 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1 (2006). 
202 Id. 
C03_SCHROEDER_010411_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 1/4/2011  6:08 PM 
2010] PROTECTING THE QUID PRO QUO SINCE 1793 95 
Some suggest the division above is improper, and that a proper 
construction contains only two requirements: 
[Construction 2:] 
[1] The specification shall contain a written 
description of the invention, and of the manner and 
process of making and using it, in such full, clear, 
concise, and exact terms as to enable any person 
skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which 
it is most nearly connected, to make and use the 
same, and 
[2] shall set forth the best mode contemplated by 
the inventor of carrying out his invention.203 
Dividing § 112, ¶ 1 into two sections, however, as in 
Construction 2 above, ignores the “, and” in part [1] (emphasized 
above).  “As a principle of statutory construction, it is presumed 
that Congress [does] not use superfluous words.”204  By contrast, 
splitting § 112, ¶ 1 into three separate and distinct requirements 
makes contextual sense, remains consistent with the plain language 
of the statute, and does not require the use of superfluous words.  
Indeed, Judge Rich, who was influential in the enactment of the 
Patent Act of 1952, declared that the written description language 
was “preserved, in writing the Patent Act of 1952, because [it was] 
familiar and had many times been construed.”205  Had Congress 
intended to remove the separate written description requirement, or 
to combine it with the enablement requirement, it could have 
removed the clause “and of the manner and process of making, 
constructing, using, and compounding the same,”206 but it did 
not.207  As Judge Rich stated, Congress intended to preserve the 
written description requirement as it was.208 
Thus, while Chief Judge Rader chastised the Enzo majority for 
disregarding the text of § 112, saying “[i]f it is possible to 
characterize disregard of statutory text as a secondary mistake, this 
 
203 Id. (emphasis added). 
204 In re Barker, 559 F.2d 588, 591–92 (C.C.P.A. 1977). 
205 Id. at 594 (Rich, J., concurring). 
206 Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 6, 5 Stat. 117, 119. 
207 See Barker, 559 F.2d at 591–92. 
208 Id. at 594 (Rich, J., concurring). 
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case fits that classification,”209 his approach is, in fact, less faithful 
to the statute.210 
2. The Written Description Requirement Survived the 
Introduction of Patent Claims. 
Chief Judge Rader suggests that the “written description” 
requirement originated with the Patent Act of 1793 but was quickly 
replaced by claims with the passage of the Patent Act of 1836.211  
On this theory, written description was collapsed into enablement 
from 1836 until 1967 when Judge Rich “created” a new written 
description doctrine to enforce priority.212  However, Chief Judge 
Rader has little case support for this proposition and does not 
address any of the cases decided between 1836 and 1967 which 
viewed written description as separate from enablement.213 
In Enzo, Judge Lourie offered perhaps the strongest response to 
Chief Judge Rader’s position.  While it may be correct that written 
description historically served a critical purpose before claims 
were required, he argued, the statute was never amended to delete 
the written description requirement once claims were 
introduced.214  In fact, language similar to today’s “written 
description” requirement in § 112, can be traced all the way back 
to each and every Patent Act since 1793 and remains “virtually 
unchanged.”215  Chief Judge Rader cites Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu 
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.216 for the proposition that “[t]he 
responsibility for changing settled law rests with Congress. . . .  
Fundamental alterations in these rules risk destroying the 
legitimate expectations of inventors in their property.”217  
 
209 Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 976 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Rader, 
J., dissenting). 
210 See Moba v. Diamond Automation, Inc., 325 F.3d 1306, 1327–28 (Bryson, J., 
concurring) (“[I]f the Ruschig line of cases is sound as a matter of statutory construction, 
it is difficult to see why that construction does not apply equally in the Lilly non-priority 
context.”). 
211 See Enzo, 323 F.3d at 977 (Rader, J., dissenting). 
212 See id. at 977–78. 
213 Id. 
214 Id. at 971 (Lourie, J., concurring). 
215 See Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916, 922 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
216  535 U.S. 722 (2002). 
217 Enzo, 323 F.3d at 982 (quoting Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki 
Co., 535 U.S. 722, 739 (2002)). 
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However, in reading the written description requirement out of § 
112, Chief Judge Rader was himself ignoring the intent of 
Congress and inviting the concomitant risks.  Moreover, as the 
Supreme Court has explained, “repeals by implication are not 
favored. . . . [T]he intention of [Congress] to repeal must be clear 
and manifest.”218  Thus, if Congress intended to repeal the written 
description requirement, it is reasonable to assume it would have 
excised it from the statute itself. 
Further, cases immediately following the creation of claims 
continued to rely on the written description requirement to 
invalidate patents.  In fact, Chief Judge Rader’s assertion that 
written description, as known pre-1836, disappeared until a new 
version resurfaced in 1967 completely ignores 131 years of 
precedent.219  The construction of § 112 that requires portions of it 
to apply only to police priority while other portions, within the 
same sentence, to apply at all times is simply untenable. 
3. Judge Rich did not “Reinvent” Written Description with In 
re Ruschig 
Chief Judge Rader continues to express his view that Judge 
Rich created a new “judge-made doctrine” of written description in 
 
218 Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 189–90 (1978) (quoting Posadas v. Nat’l 
City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936)). 
219 See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 312 (1980) (discussing how the 
Plant Patent Act of 1930 was enacted in part to overcome an obstacle to plant patents 
regarding their ability to satisfy the written description requirement); Schriber-Schroth v. 
Cleveland Trust, 305 U.S. 47, 61 (1938) (invalidating patent to “laterally flexible web” in 
piston design for an internal combustion engine for lack of written description support); 
R.R. Co. v. Mellon, 104 U.S. 112, 117–18 (1881) (observing that the Patent Act of 1836 
has a written description requirement to make a patent valid as well as an enablement 
requirement); Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568, 573–74 (1876) (invalidating 
infringement claim to deodorized heavy oils for lack of written description); O’Reilly v. 
Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 120–21 (1854) (invalidating a claim of Samuel Morse for 
failure to satisfy the written description requirement); Jepson v. Coleman, 314 F.2d 533 
(C.C.P.A. 1963) (denying priority to inventor in interference when parent application did 
not satisfy written description requirement despite providing an enabling disclosure); In 
re Gay, 309 F.2d 769, 772 (C.C.P.A. 1962) (stating that “two of the several” 
requirements of § 112 include enablement and best mode which implies that something 
else must remain); In re Sus, 306 F.2d 494, 495–96 (C.C.P.A. 1962) (invalidating patent 
claims for being “unduly broad,” or beyond the scope of the invention described in the 
“written description”); In re Moore, 155 F.2d 379, 382 (C.C.P.A. 1946) (invalidating 
claims for being broader than written description). 
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1967 in In re Ruschig.220  In making this broad pronouncement, 
Chief Judge Rader overlooks many of the earlier decisions 
applying the written description requirement between 1836 and 
1967 from both the Supreme Court and the CCPA.221  In Chief 
Judge Rader’s defense, he has clearly pinpointed one function and 
application of the written description requirement—namely, that of 
preventing inventors from writing a broad specification, then later, 
in response to an interference or to swear behind a reference, 
attempting to claim something broader than originally invented.  
Chief Judge Rader cannot, however, point to any support for the 
proposition that the written description requirement under § 112 is 
only to be applied in those limited situations.  As Judge Bryson 
pointed out in his concurrence in Moba, “[t]here is no language in 
section 112 that would support such a restriction.”222 
For example, consider In re DiLeone.223  The sole issue in this 
case was “whether the specification satisfie[d] the [written] 
description requirement of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 
112.”224  The panel, including Judge Rich, reiterated that the 
written description requirement is separate and distinct from 
enablement.225  In fact, the court recognized that the written 
description requirement need not rise and fall with the enablement 
requirement.226  The court certainly did not say, “this only applies 
to police priority.”  Although the court “note[d] that the expression 
in question appeared in the originally filed claims,” the court did 
not rely solely on that fact to resolve the matter.227  Rather, the 
CCPA performed the requisite fact-based analysis and determined 
 
220 See Rochester, 375 F.3d at 1311 (Rader, J., dissenting) (“Judge Rich, the first judge 
to use the description requirement to police priority . . . .”); Moba B.V. v. Diamond 
Automation, Inc., 325 F.3d 1306, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (“[CCPA] 
inaugurated use of § 112 to prevent the addition of new matter to claims.”); Id. at 1323–
24 (Rader, J., concurring) (“In In re Ruschig, this court’s predecessor court created a new 
written description requirement for the sole purpose of enforcing priority issues.”); Enzo, 
323 F.3d at 977–78 (Rader, J., dissenting) (“[CCPA] created for the first time a new WD 
doctrine to enforce priority.”). 
221 See Federal Circuit Act of 1982, supra note 90. 
222 Moba, 325 F.3d at 1327 (Bryson, J., concurring). 
223 436 F.2d 1404 (C.C.P.A. 1971). 
224 Id. at 1405. 
225 Id. 
226 Id. 
227 Id. at 1406. 
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the specification was at least as broad as the applicant’s broadest 
claims.228  If Chief Judge Rader’s view of the law is correct, the 
court would have simply stopped once it realized the expression in 
question was in the originally filed claims. 
Similarly, in In re Moore,229 the CCPA, analyzing § 112, 
explained that the first inquiry is to determine if the claims “set out 
and circumscribe a particular area with a reasonable degree of 
precision and particularity.”230  If they do, then the court turns to 
the many requirements of § 112, ¶ 1.231  One of these is 
“determining whether the subject matter defined in the claims is 
described in the specification.”232  This “written description” 
requirement is “relatively simple to comply with and thus will 
ordinarily demand minimal concern on the part of the Patent 
Office.”233  Again, as in In re DiLeone, the court nowhere states 
that the written description requirement is only relevant when 
dealing with issues of priority.  In this case, it is unclear whether 
the claims were as originally filed, however, they were 
“consistently rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112” which suggests they 
were rejected from the very beginning of prosecution before the 
USPTO.234 
Likewise, in In re Sus, the court actually did reject claims, as 
originally filed, which were broader than the invention set forth in 
the written description.235  In so doing, the court explained that the 
purpose embodied in the written description requirement is that an 
“invention claimed shall be no broader than the invention set forth 
in the written description forming part of the specification.”236  The 
court analyzed the appealed claims and found that they “fail[ed] to 
meet the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112 in that they [were] 
broader than the invention described in the written description 
 
228 See id. at 1405–06. 




233 Id. at 1236. 
234 Id. at 1234. 
235 In re Sus, 306 F.2d 494, 497 (C.C.P.A. 1962). 
236 Id. 
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thereof as set forth in the specification.”237  Further, “one skilled in 
this art would not be taught by these examples that all ‘aryl and 
substituted aryl radicals’ were properly within the subject matter 
which appellants consider to be their invention.”238  Although In re 
Sus may have been initially decided under §112, ¶ 2, Judge Rich 
himself noted it was more properly considered under the first 
paragraph.239  Tellingly, the only other portion of § 112 quoted by 
the court in In re Sus is the precise language of the written 
description requirement: “The specification shall contain a written 
description of the invention.”240 
In summary, Chief Judge Rader’s assertion that Judge Rich 
resurrected a new written description requirement in 1967 for the 
sole purpose of policing priority finds no support in 131 years of 
precedent where the Supreme Court continued to apply the written 
description requirement after claims were added to patents.241  
Most interestingly, it was not even supported by Judge Rich in In 
re Sus, five years prior to his alleged creation of the doctrine.242  
Even in Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, Judge Rich stated only that 
“the ‘written description’ requirement most often comes into play 
where claims not presented in the application when filed are 
presented thereafter;” he does not say it “only” comes into play in 
those situations.243  Finally, Chief Judge Rader’s position lacks 
support in the decisions of the CCPA immediately following the 
creation of this “new” written description doctrine.244 
4. The CCPA and the Federal Circuit have Applied the 
Written Description Requirement to Original Claims 
Chief Judge Rader, in Enzo, maintained that “[a]t no time did 
either the CCPA or the Federal Circuit purport to apply the 
 
237 Id. 
238 Id. at 504 (emphasis added).   
239 See In re Robins, 429 F.2d 455, 457 n.8 (C.C.P.A. 1970). 
240 Sus, 306 F.2d at 494 n.1 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006)). 
241 See supra note 220. 
242 See Sus, 306 F.2d at 497. 
243 935 F.2d 1555, 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (emphasis added). 
244 See, e.g., In re Moore, 439 F.2d 1232, 1235 (C.C.P.A. 1971); In re Wertheim, 541 
F.2d 257, 262 (C.C.P.A. 1976); In re Barker, 559 F.2d 588, 592 (C.C.P.A. 1977). 
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equivalent new matter/written description rejections to original 
claims or other claims without priority problems.”245 
First, simply because the CCPA or the Federal Circuit has not 
had the opportunity to apply a § 112 written description rejection 
to originally filed claims does not mean that § 112 written 
description has no application to originally filed claims.  Courts 
“decide cases as they come to [them], based on the arguments 
raised, the decisions below, the law, the facts, and [their] best 
efforts,”246 so just because neither the CCPA nor the Federal 
Circuit was presented with the opportunity to strike down original 
claims under § 112 written description does not mean § 112 
written description does not apply to original claims.  Instead, at 
worst, it means the issue is undecided and at best, it means § 112 
would apply to original claims as it would any other claim.247  
Further, as stated above, the CCPA’s appellate jurisdiction over 
patent cases was far more limited than the current jurisdiction of 
the Federal Circuit.248  It is therefore entirely plausible that the 
Federal Circuit would face a situation calling for an application of 
an established doctrine at the CCPA to a new factual scenario. 
Second, the CCPA has indeed applied the written description 
doctrine to originally filed claims in In re Sus and In re DiLeone, 
and the Federal Circuit applied written description to originally 
filed claims in Fiers.249  That the court did not have more 
opportunities before it to issue rejections under § 112 written 
description is both irrelevant and consistent with the CCPA’s 
limited jurisdiction of patent cases, hearing such cases only on 
appeal from the USPTO.250  Moreover, at that time in the court’s 
 
245 Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 979 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
246 Id. at 974. 
247 See id. at 971–72 (Lourie, J., concurring) (“As for the lack of earlier cases on this 
issue, it regularly happens in adjudication that issues do not arise until counsel raise them, 
and, when that occurs, courts are then required to decide them.”). 
248 See supra notes 90, 93 and accompanying text. 
249 See In re DiLeone, 436 F.2d 1404, 1405 (C.C.P.A. 1971); In re Sus, 306 F.2d 494, 
497 (C.C.P.A. 1962); see also Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1170 (Fed. Cir. 1993) 
(“Revel thus urges that only similar language in the specification or original claims is 
necessary to satisfy the written description requirement.  We disagree.”). 
250 See, e.g., In re Steinhauer, 410 F.2d 411, 412 (C.C.P.A. 1969). 
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history, the USPTO was particularly imprecise in issuing rejections 
under 35 U.S.C. § 112.251 
The bottom line is that the Federal Circuit and the CCPA do 
not need to continuously apply the written description requirement 
to the fullest extent possible in order to prevent the written 
description requirement from becoming extinct.  The written 
description requirement has been a part of the Patent Act since 
1793, the Supreme Court has affirmed and reaffirmed its existence, 
and the doctrine still exists today. 
5. The Holding in In re Gardner Has Been Misunderstood. 
 Chief Judge Rader cited cases such as In re Gardner, for the 
proposition that status as an original claim is all that is necessary to 
satisfy the written description requirement for § 112.252  In 
Gardner, the court actually stated that “[c]laim 2, which apparently 
was an original claim, in itself constituted a description in the 
original disclosure equivalent in scope and identical in language to 
the total subject matter now being claimed.”253 Because the written 
description requirement is a fact-based inquiry which must be 
made in each case, this quote from Gardner should not be 
misconstrued as stating that every original claim automatically 
satisfies the written description requirement of § 112.  Rather, in 
this case, claim 2 covered a total of seventeen compounds and 
delineated a subgenus.254  The USPTO’s § 112 rejection was based 
on the fact that only three out of the five possible R(1) substituents 
were specifically exemplified in the specification and no language 
was found in the specification corresponding to the subgenus.255  
Effectively, the CCPA was saying that the level of detail necessary 
to satisfy the written description requirement was present in the 
 
251  See, e.g., In re Robins, 429 F.2d 455, 456 n.5 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (“Our consideration 
of this appeal would have been immeasurably simplified had the examiner merely 
referred to the specific language in § 112, or at least to the paragraph in which it is to be 
found.”); In re Gay, 309 F.2d 769, 772 (C.C.P.A. 1962) (“We have set forth the Patent 
Office position in some detail as we feel that it confuses, and in fact is in part contrary to, 
two of the several requirements of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112.”). 
252 See Enzo, 323 F.3d at 979 (citing In re Gardner, 475 F.2d 1389, 1391 (C.C.P.A. 
1973)). 
253 Gardner, 475 F.2d at 1391. 
254 Id. 
255 Id. 
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claims as filed, which themselves constitute part of the 
specification.256  Furthermore, the court found sufficient evidence 
of enablement in the specification as well.257  This decision 
prevents the USPTO from issuing a hyper-technical rejection 
whereby a claim is rejected for lack of written description simply 
because the language of the claim was not copied, in ipsis verbis, 
into the specification before filing. 
The CCPA’s position in Gardner is consistent with Judge 
Lourie’s majority opinion in Enzo.258  Enzo argued that the written 
description requirement was met as a matter of law because the 
claim language appeared in ipsis verbis in the specification.259  The 
court disagreed, finding that “[t]he appearance of mere indistinct 
words in a specification or a claim, even an original claim, does 
not necessarily satisfy [the written description] requirement.”260  In 
both Enzo and Lilly, the court was “faced with a set of facts in 
which the words of the claim alone did not convey an adequate 
description of the invention.”261  In those situations, “regardless 
whether the claim appears in the original specification and is thus 
supported by the specification as of the filing date, § 112 ¶ 1 is not 
necessarily met.”262  “If a purported description of an invention 
does not meet the requirements of the statute, the fact that it 
appears as an original claim or in the specification does not save it.  
A claim does not become more descriptive by its repetition, or its 
longevity.”263 
6. The Claims Still Define the Invention 
Judge Linn is skeptical of the separate written description 
requirement because “the claims—not the specification—define 
the invention.”264  However, for an inventor to be entitled to patent 
 
256 See id. 
257 See id. at 1392. 
258 Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 968 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
259 Id. (citing Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1567 (Fed. 
Cir. 1997)). 
260 See Enzo, 323 F.3d at 968. 
261 Id. 
262 Id. 
263 Id. at 968–69. 
264 Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 F.3d 1366, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2009), aff’d en 
banc, 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
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claims of any scope, he must first satisfy the written description 
requirement.265  “Interpretation of written description as this court 
has done furthers the goal of the law to have claims commensurate 
in scope with what has been disclosed to the public.”266  The 
claims serve as the absolute outer bounds of the scope of the 
invention.  As part of the quid pro quo of the patent system, in 
exchange for the patent, the inventor must describe his particular 
invention commensurate with the scope he has claimed.267 
7. A Specification May Enable One of Skill in the Art to 
Make and Use an Invention Without Providing Adequate 
Written Description 
While it has been suggested that the distinction between the 
written description requirement and enablement requirement may 
not make a difference in some cases, there are a few situations 
where the specification at issue was found to satisfy the 
enablement requirement but not to satisfy the written description 
requirement.268   
For example, in Fields v. Conover, Judge Rich explicitly stated 
that “a specification may provide adequate teachings of how to 
make and use subject matter which is subsequently claimed and yet 
fail to contain a written description thereof which complies with 
the first requirement of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112.”269 
Fields involved an interference between two parties on 
“substituted 4,10-dioxo-5-hydroxy-1,2,3,4,4a,9,9a,10-octahydro[-] 
anthracenes.”270  The only issue on appeal was whether the 
 
265 See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006). 
266 Enzo, 323 F.3d at 972 (Lourie, J., concurring). 
267 See In re Sus, 306 F.2d 494, 497 (C.C.P.A. 1962) (“The public purpose on which the 
patent law rests requires the granting of claims commensurate in scope with the invention 
disclosed . . . the invention claimed shall be no broader than the invention set forth in the 
written description forming part of the specification.”). 
268 See Enzo, 323 F.3d at 974 (“Perhaps there is little difference in electrical and 
mechanical inventions between describing an invention and enabling one to make and use 
it, but that is not true of chemical and chemical-like inventions.”).  In fact, Judge 
Newman once conflated the two in Kennecott Corp. v. Kyocera Int’l, Inc., 835 F.2d 
1419, 1421 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“The purpose of the description requirement is to state what 
is needed to fulfill the enablement criteria.”). 
269 Fields v. Conover, 443 F.2d 1386, 1391 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (citing In re Ahlbrecht, 435 
F.2d 908, 911 (C.C.P.A. 1971)). 
270 Id. at 1386. 
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disclosure of the Conover application satisfied the written 
description and enablement requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112.271  
The court found the enablement requirement was satisfied; one of 
ordinary skill in the art would be enabled, without undue 
experimentation, to make and use the claimed substance.272  While 
the Conover application provides some “suggestions or guidance” 
to support the claim, this was not enough to satisfy the written 
description requirement.273  The suggestions and guidance 
provided in the application fell far short of the “full, clear, concise, 
and exact” written description requirement.274  Similar cases have 
also noted that compliance with enablement does not necessarily 
satisfy the written description requirement.275 
C. Common Ground 
The judges of the Federal Circuit have varying viewpoints on 
the legitimacy of a written description requirement in 35 U.S.C. § 
112.  Nevertheless, some common threads run through the 
opinions of the CCPA and the Federal Circuit notwithstanding the 
debate over the scope, or even the existence, of the written 
description requirement.  For instance, all appear to agree on a few 
key concepts: 1) the inventor is not entitled to a patent broader than 
his true contribution to society in the form of his invention; 2) 
whether the patent is broader than the disclosed invention is a fact-
based inquiry requiring a case-by-case assessment; 3) in the vast 
majority of cases, “enablement” and “written description” will rise 
and fall together.  To sidestep the written description debate, this 
Section will refer generally to the “disclosure requirements of § 
112.” 
1. An Inventor Is Entitled to a Patent Commensurate in Scope 
with His Contribution to Society. 
The disclosure requirements of § 112 satisfy the policy premise 
of the law “whereby the inventor’s technical/scientific advance is 
 
271 Id. at 1390. 
272 Id. at 1391. 
273 See id. at 1392 (quoting Biel v. Chessin, 347 F.2d 898, 905 (C.C.P.A. 1965)). 
274 Fields, 443 F.2d at 1392 (quoting Ahlbrecht, 435 F.2d at 911). 
275 See, e.g., Albrecht, 435 F.2d at 911 (finding that a patent application for a chemical 
compound lacked a description “in full, clear, concise, and exact terms”). 
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added to the body of knowledge, as consideration for the grant of 
patent exclusivity.”276  The purpose of the disclosure requirements 
of § 112 is “to ensure that the scope of the right to exclude, as set 
forth in the claims, does not overreach the scope of the inventor’s 
contribution to the field of art as described in the patent 
specification.”277  The measure of the inventor’s contribution, for 
purposes of compliance with the disclosure requirements of § 112, 
is determined by what the patent teaches one of ordinary skill in 
the art.278  Hence, Judge Schall noted: 
If a person of ordinary skill in the art would have 
understood the inventor to have been in possession 
of the claimed invention at the time of filing, even if 
every nuance of the claims is not explicitly 
described in the specification, then the adequate 
written description requirement is met.279 
While the judges’ opinions differ as to what is encompassed 
within the disclosure requirements of § 112, and the appropriate 
grounds for rejection when those requirements are not met, it is 
well settled that “claims in an application which are broader than 
the applicant’s disclosure are not allowable.”280  Thus, the debate 
arises over what to call a rejection of this type and what portion of 
§ 112 provides the standard. 
2. Whether a Patent Exceeds the Scope of the Inventor’s 
Contribution to Society Is a Fact-Based Question Requiring 
Case-by-Case Assessment 
In determining compliance with the disclosure requirements of 
§ 112, “the primary consideration is factual and depends on the 
nature of the invention and the amount of knowledge imparted to 
those skilled in the art by the disclosure.”281  This inquiry will 
“necessarily vary depending on the nature of the invention 
 
276 Capon v. Eshhar, 418 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
277 Reiffin v. Microsoft Corp., 214 F.3d 1342, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (per curiam). 
278 See In re Goodman, 11 F.3d 1046, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (quoting In re Vaeck, 947 
F.2d 488, 496 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). 
279 In re Alton, 76 F.3d 1168, 1175 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
280 In re Moore, 155 F.2d 379, 382 (C.C.P.A. 1946). 
281 Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 208 F.3d 989, 996 (Fed. Cir. 2000) 
(quoting In re Wertheim, 541 F.2d 257, 262 (C.C.P.A. 1976)). 
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claimed.”282  “Broadly articulated rules are peculiarly inappropriate 
in this area” and an analysis of each case on its facts must be 
made.283  Application of this doctrine will vary based on the 
relevant knowledge already in existence regarding the nature and 
scope of the invention.284  Thus, “[a]s each field evolves, the 
balance also evolves between what is known and what is added by 
each inventive contribution.”285 
3. Most of the Times a Patent Fails to Satisfy the Enablement 
Requirement it Will Also Fail to Satisfy Judge Lourie’s 
Written Description Requirement 
Judge Bryson, writing for the court in LizardTech, Inc. v. Earth 
Resource Mapping, Inc., noted that the written description and 
enablement requirements “usually rise and fall together.”286  That 
is, “recitation of how to make and use the invention across the full 
breadth of the claim is ordinarily sufficient to demonstrate that the 
inventor possesses the full scope of the invention, and vice 
versa.”287  Even Judge Lourie, perhaps the strongest proponent of a 
separate written description requirement among the disclosure 
requirements in § 112, agrees that in many situations drawing a 
distinction between written description and enablement is 
unnecessary.288  It should come as no surprise, then, that in Ariad 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Co., Lilly also appealed the 
district court’s finding that the patent was enabled.289  Further, 
 
282 Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 963 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (quoting 
Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). 
283 Wertheim, 541 F.2d at 263. 
284 Capon v. Eshhar, 418 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
285 Id. at 1358. 
286 LizardTech, Inc. v. Earth Res. Mapping, Inc., 424 F.3d 1336, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2005).  
But see In re DiLeone, 436 F.2d 1404, 1405 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (noting earlier cases 
recognizing that the written description requirement might not be met even when the 
patent claim satisfies the enabling requirement). 
287 LizardTech, 424 F.3d at 1345. 
288 Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 974 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“Perhaps 
there is little difference in electrical and mechanical inventions between describing an 
invention and enabling one to make and use it, but that is not true of chemical and 
chemical-like inventions.”). 
289 Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 F.3d 1366, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2009), aff’d en 
banc, 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
C03_SCHROEDER_010411_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 1/4/2011  6:08 PM 
108 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 21:63 
Judge Linn, in concurrence, suggested that enablement likely was 
not satisfied.290 
In summary, most agree that if a separate written description 
requirement is not recognized, the majority of cases will turn out 
the same.291  In the cases where the written description requirement 
would have invalidated a patent, the patent will likely be invalid 
for failure to satisfy the enablement requirement.292  It appears the 
fight is really over those few instances where the specification 
would enable one of ordinary skill in the art to practice the 
invention, yet the specification does not describe the invention in 
such a manner as to assure one of ordinary skill in the art that the 
inventor actually invented what he claimed. 
CONCLUSION 
The written description requirement traces its origin at least as 
far back as 1790 and has been consistently applied over the years 
to protect the public from overreaching inventors who claim to 
have invented what they have not.  It is a doctrine which, like best 
mode and enablement, serves to later invalidate a patent when the 
inventor is disingenuous or insufficiently forthcoming to the public 
to secure the exclusive right to exclude.  While certain judges on 
the Federal Circuit maintain diverging views of the written 
description requirement, they all agree on a few foundational 
aspects of the United States patent system.  These aspects are 
embodied within the written description requirement as envisioned 
by a majority of Federal Circuit and CCPA judges and have been 
reaffirmed over the ages by the Supreme Court.  In reaffirming the 
existence of an independent written description requirement, the 
Federal Circuit heeded binding Supreme Court precedent and the 
foundations upon which our Nation’s patent system rests. 
Our patent system rewards inventors, not those who merely 
come up with a research plan or a wish.  An inventor is entitled to 
the right to exclude only over that which he has actually invented.  
 
290 See id. at 1381 (“It may be, as Lilly argues, that such a claim can never be valid, 
since the specification cannot enable unknown methods.”). 
291 See supra notes 286–87 and accompanying text. 
292 See supra Part III.A. 
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This ensures that future inventors are not dissuaded from 
improving existing inventions.  The public is better served by a 
requirement that patent applications “possess[] that precision and 
clearness of statement with which one who proposes to secure a 
monopoly at the expense of the public ought to describe the thing 
which no one but himself can use or enjoy, without paying him for 
the privilege of doing so.”293  This requirement is the written 
description requirement contained within 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1, 
consistent with Judge Lourie’s expression of the written 
description requirement, and that reaffirmed by him in the court’s 
en banc resolution of Ariad. 
 
 
293 Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568, 570 (1876). 
